



# 大学录取制度的经济学解析

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<sup>1</sup> Chen, Y., and O. Kesten, Chinese College Admissions and School Choice Reforms: A Theoretical Analysis, Journal of Political Economy, 125:1 (2017), 99-139.



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<sup>2</sup> Lien, Jaimie, Jie Zheng, and Xiaohan Zhong, Ex-ante Fairness in the Boston and Serial Dictatorship Mechanisms under Pre-exam and Post-exam Preference, Games and Economic Behavior, Special Issue in Honor of John O. Ledyard, Vol. 101, Jan. 2017, 98-120.

<sup>3</sup> Lien, Jaimie, Jie Zheng, and Xiaohan Zhong, Preference Submission Timing in School Choice Matching: Testing Efficiency and Fairness in the Laboratory, Experimental Economics, Vol. 19, Issue 1, Mar. 2016, pp. 116-150.

<sup>4</sup> Wu, Binzhen, and Xiaohan Zhong, Matching Mechanisms and Matching Quality: Evidence from a Top University in China, Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 84, Mar. 2014, pp. 196-215.