

# Understanding the Puzzling Effects of Technology Shocks

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# Introduction

- RBC theory: technology expansionary.
- Gali (AER 1999) and Basu et al. (AER 2006): technology contractionary for  $I_t$  &  $N_t$ .
- Two implications: (i) technology shocks not main driving force; (ii) sticky prices.
- "the RBC theory is dead" (Francis and Ramey, JME 2005).


- It is possible that technology shocks not important and prices sticky.
- However, the finding of Gali and Basu et al. does not logically imply these are indeed the case.
- (i) the sign of the initial impulse responses to technology shocks does not imply lack of procyclicality.
- (ii) contractionary effect of technology shocks does not necessarily reject flexible prices – the main focus of our paper.

- In what follows, we first present empirical regularities that appear to be profoundly inconsistent with flexible prices. Then we show that this is not the case.

## Stylized Facts

$$\begin{vmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ -c_0 & 1 \end{vmatrix} \begin{vmatrix} x_t \\ y_t \end{vmatrix} = \begin{vmatrix} a_1 & 0 \\ c_1 & b_1 \end{vmatrix} \begin{vmatrix} x_{t-1} \\ y_{t-1} \end{vmatrix} + \begin{vmatrix} a_2 & 0 \\ c_2 & b_2 \end{vmatrix} \begin{vmatrix} x_{t-2} \\ y_{t-2} \end{vmatrix} + \begin{vmatrix} \varepsilon_t \\ \nu_t \end{vmatrix}$$

$$\begin{vmatrix} x_t \\ y_t \end{vmatrix} = \begin{vmatrix} a_1 & d_1 \\ c_1 & b_1 \end{vmatrix} \begin{vmatrix} x_{t-1} \\ y_{t-1} \end{vmatrix} + \begin{vmatrix} a_2 & d_2 \\ c_2 & b_2 \end{vmatrix} \begin{vmatrix} x_{t-2} \\ y_{t-2} \end{vmatrix} + \begin{vmatrix} e_{xt} \\ e_{yt} \end{vmatrix}$$






Figure 2. Sectorial Response to Agg. Tech. Shock




Figure 3. Response of Real Wage and Real Rate.

$$\Phi\alpha\frac{Y}{K} = r, \Phi(1 - \alpha)\frac{Y}{N} = w.$$




Figure 4. Distribution of Correlations






Fig 5. Sectorial Response to Sector-Specific

- Why tech shock contractionary and asymmetric?
- Our approach: Leontief technology at the firm level, with firm entry and exit. Prices fully flexible.
- Our model provides micro foundation to aggregate production functions, and is identical to a standard frictionless RBC model in aggregate dynamics if no time-to-build.
- However, with time-to-build, our model is able to explain all of the aforementioned empirical facts.

# Benchmark Model

## Final Good ( $y$ )

- Identical producers  $i \in [0, \Omega_t]$ , each producing one unit of final good. (Imagine a production assembly line with fixed production capacity.)
- Entry cost =  $\Phi$ . Prob of exist =  $\theta_t$ . Zero profit  $\Rightarrow$  total number of producers  $\Omega_t$ .
- Production function:  $y = x$ . Normalization:  $p_y = 1$ .

- Demand for input:

$$x = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } p_x \leq 1 \\ 0 & \text{if } p_x > 1 \end{cases} .$$

- Profit:

$$\pi = \begin{cases} 1 - p_x & \text{if } p_x \leq 1 \\ 0 & \text{if } p_x > 1 \end{cases} .$$

- Aggregate supply of output:  $Y = \int_0^{\Omega} y di = \Omega$ , aggregate demand for input is  $\int_{i=0}^{\Omega} x di = \Omega$ .




Figure 6. Production Structure.

- The value of a firm (with time-to-build):

$$V_t = \beta E_t \Lambda_{t+1} \pi_{t+1} + E_t \sum_{j=1}^{\infty} \beta^{j+1} \left[ \prod_{i=1}^j (1 - \theta_{t+i}) \right] \Lambda_{t+j+1} \pi_{t+j+1},$$

$\Rightarrow$

$$V_t = \beta E_t \Lambda_{t+1} (\pi_{t+1} + (1 - \theta_{t+1}) V_{t+1}).$$

- Free entry  $\Rightarrow V_t = \Phi$ .

- Evolution of  $\Omega$ :

$$\Omega_{t+1} = (1 - \theta_t) \Omega_t + s_t,$$

where  $s$  = new entrants.

## Intermediate good

- Infinitely many identical intermediate good producers, with production function:

$$X_t = A_t K_t^\alpha N_t^{1-\alpha}.$$

- Profit maximization gives

$$\alpha p_x \frac{X}{K} = r_t + \delta,$$

$$(1 - \alpha) p_x \frac{X}{N} = w_t.$$

- Perfect competition  $\Rightarrow$  price equals marginal cost:

$$p_x = \frac{1}{A} \left( \frac{r + \delta}{\alpha} \right)^\alpha \left( \frac{w}{1 - \alpha} \right)^{1-\alpha}.$$

- One representative firm  $\rightarrow$  aggregate supply of intermediate good is  $X$ .

# Household

- Net profit income (from final good producers):

$$\Pi_t = \int_{i=0}^{\Omega} \pi_t di - s_t \Phi.$$

- Utility maximization:

$$\max E_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t [\log(C_t) + \gamma \log(1 - N_t)],$$

s.t.

$$C_t + K_{t+1} = w_t N_t + (1 + r_t) K_t + \Pi_t.$$



# General equilibrium

$$\Phi = \beta E_t \Lambda_{t+1} (\pi_{t+1} + (1 - \theta_{t+1}) \Phi), \quad 1$$

$$\Omega_{t+1} = (1 - \theta_t) \Omega_t + s_t, \quad 2$$

$$\pi_t = 1 - p_{xt}, \quad 3$$

$$\alpha p_{xt} \frac{Y_t}{K_t} = r_t + \delta, \quad (1 - \alpha) p_{xt} \frac{Y_t}{N_t} = w_t \quad 4$$

$$w_t C_t^{-1} = \gamma (1 - N_t)^{-1}, \quad 5$$

$$C_t^{-1} = \beta E_t C_{t+1}^{-1} (1 + r_{t+1}). \quad 6$$

$$C_t + K_{t+1} - (1 - \delta) K_t + s_t \Phi = A_t K_t^\alpha N_t^{1-\alpha}, \quad 7$$

# Equivalence to standard RBC model

- Suppose  $\theta = 1$  and no time-to-build.
- Then  $V_t = \pi_t = \Phi$ . Hence  $p_{xt} = 1 - \Phi$  and  $s_t = \Omega_t$ .
- The aggregate resource constraint becomes


$$C_t + K_{t+1} - (1 - \delta)K_t = (1 - \Phi)A_t K_t^\alpha N_t^{1-\alpha}.$$

- The dynamics of this model are the same as those implied by a standard frictionless RBC model (e.g., King, Plosser and Rebelo, 1988).

## Impulse responses

- *Calibration.*  $\beta = 0.96, \alpha = 0.4, \delta = 0.1, \bar{N} = 0.2$  (about 35 hours per week). Let  $\Phi = 0.1$ . The results are not sensitive to these parameter values.
- Assume  $\log(\theta_t) = \eta \log(\varepsilon_t)$ . In the U.S. (1949-1996), 1% increase in  $\varepsilon$  reduces the business failure rate by 6%, hence we set  $\eta = -6$ .
- The average business failure rate (at annual frequency) for the U.S. economy implies  $\bar{\theta} \approx 0.1$ . We simulate the model using two alternative values,  $\bar{\theta} = \{0.1, 0.25\}$ . These values imply a steady-state markup in the range of 1.5 ~ 4%.

$\theta = 0.1$





# Multisector Model

- The production function:

$$y = \int_{j=0}^1 x_j dj.$$

where the price of  $x_j$  is  $p_j$ .

- The demand for  $x_j$ :

$$x_j = \begin{cases} a_j & \text{if } p_j \leq 1 \\ 0 & \text{if } p_j > 1 \end{cases},$$

where  $\langle a_j \rangle$  is the input-output coefficient matrix.

- The production function for intermediate good  $j$ :

$$X_j = AZ_j F(K_j, N_j).$$




Figure 9. Multi-Sector Model.

- The gross profit for a final good producer is

$$\pi = y - \int_0^1 a_j p_j dj.$$

- The rest of the model's structure is similar:

$$V_t = \beta E_t \Lambda_{t+1} (\pi_{t+1} + (1 - \theta_{t+1}) V_{t+1}), \quad \Omega_{t+1} = (1 - \theta_t) \Omega_t + s_t,$$

$$y = \int_{j=0}^1 a_j dj = 1, \quad Y_t = \int_{i=0}^{\Omega_t} y di = \Omega_t, \quad \Pi = \int_{i=0}^{\Omega} \pi di - s\Phi,$$

$C_t + K_{t+1} = w_t N_t + (1 + r_t) K_t + \Pi_t$ , where  $K = \int_0^1 K_j dj$  and  $N = \int_0^1 N_j dj$ . The first order conditions for the household are the same as before.

- Profit maximization for each intermediate good firm in sector  $j$  gives  $\alpha p_j \frac{X_j}{K_j} = r + \delta$  and  $(1 - \alpha) p_j \frac{X_j}{N_j} = w$ . → Marginal cost of good  $j$ :

$$p_j = \frac{1}{AZ_j} \left( \frac{r + \delta}{\alpha} \right)^\alpha \left( \frac{w}{1 - \alpha} \right)^{1 - \alpha}.$$



- The aggregate output

$$Y = \int_{i=0}^{\Omega} \left( \int_{j=0}^1 a_j dj \right) di = \int_{j=0}^1 (a_j \Omega) dj,$$

where  $a_j \Omega = X_j$  is the aggregate demand for intermediate good  $j$ .

- Hence,  $\frac{X_j}{X_i} = \frac{a_j}{a_i}$ ,  $\frac{Z_j K_j}{a_j} = \frac{Z_i K_i}{a_i}$  and  $\frac{Z_j N_j}{a_j} = \frac{Z_i N_i}{a_i}$ .

- $\rightarrow K_j = \left( \int_0^1 \frac{a_i}{Z_i} di \right) \frac{a_j}{Z_j} K$ ,  $N_j = \left( \int_0^1 \frac{a_i}{Z_i} di \right) \frac{a_j}{Z_j} N$ . Take the normalization,  $\left( \int_0^1 \frac{a_i}{Z_i} di \right) = 1$ , we have

$$K_j = \frac{a_j}{Z_j} K,$$

$$N_j = \frac{a_j}{Z_j} N.$$

- Substituting  $K_j$  and  $N_j$  into  $X_j = AZ_j K_j^\alpha N_j^{1-\alpha}$  gives

$$X_j = a_j A K^\alpha N^{1-\alpha}.$$

- In equilibrium the final good production function becomes

$$Y = \int_{j=0}^1 (a_j \Omega) dj = \int_{j=0}^1 X_j dj = A K^\alpha N^{1-\alpha}.$$

## Impulse responses

- Impulse responses of aggregate variables, such as  $\{Y, C, I, N\}$ , to aggregate technology shocks are the same as before.
- Impulse responses of sectors to aggregate and sector-specific technology shocks:

$$K_j = \frac{a_j}{Z_j} K,$$

$$N_j = \frac{a_j}{Z_j} N.$$

$$X_j = a_j Y.$$

- Equivalence to standard RBC model: Yes, if  $\theta = 1$  and no time to build.

# Explaining Heterogeneity

- Although our model is broadly consistent with stylized facts, it lacks the ability to explain heterogeneous responses across sectors.
- Consider final good firms are heterogeneous because each firm  $i$  gets a different draw of  $a_j$ . Namely, firm  $i$  can transform one unit of intermediate good  $j$  into  $a(i,j)$  units of final good. → Input-output matrix =  $\{a(i,j)\}_{i \in [0,\Omega], j \in [0,1]}$ .
- The production function:

$$y_i = \int_0^1 a(i,j)I(i,j)dj,$$

where  $I(i,j) = 1$  if  $a(i,j) \geq p_j$  and  $I(i,j) = 0$  if  $a(i,j) < p_j$ .

- Assume  $f_j(a_{i,j}) \neq f_k(a_{i,j})$  if  $j \neq k$ . Denote  $F_j(p_j) = \Pr[a(i,j) \geq p_j] = \int_{p_j} a(i,j)f_j(a)da.$
- The aggregate demand for intermediate good  $j$ , by the law of large number, is then

$$X_{jf}$$


## ***Impulse responses to sector-specific technology shocks.***

- Around the steady state the percentage change of factor demand with respect to  $Z_j$  are given by

$$\hat{K}_j = (\epsilon_j - 1)\hat{Z}_j,$$

$$\hat{N}_j = (\epsilon_j - 1)\hat{Z}_j;$$

- Hence, allowing for heterogeneity in  $f_j(a)$  can explain the heterogeneous responses of inputs across sectors. This has little effects on the impulse responses of the model to aggregate technology shocks.



Responses to Demand.

# Discussion

- A micro level rigidity in factor-demand does not by itself imply any aggregate rigidities, as long as  $\Omega$  is variable.
- Example 1:

$$y_i = \int a_{i,j} I(i,j) di,$$

where  $a_{i,j} \sim$  Pareto distribution  $F(a) = 1 - \left(\frac{1}{a}\right)$



$$y_i = a_i k + b_i n,$$

where  $k$  is capital,  $n$  is labor, and  $\{a_i, b_i\} \sim$  Pareto distribution.

- Let the demand functions be

$$k = \alpha \text{ if } a_i \geq r, \text{ otherwise } k = 0;$$

$$n = \beta \text{ if } b_i \geq w, \text{ otherwise } n = 0;$$

where  $\{r, w\}$  stand for prices of capital and labor.

- If  $\theta = 1$  and no time-to-build, we obtain

$$Y = A(\Phi) \left[ \alpha^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} K^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} + \beta^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} L^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \right]^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}}.$$

- Example 3: If the Pareto distribution is replaced by the **Uniform** distribution, then

$$Y = \int_0^1 X_j dj - \left( \frac{\Phi}{2} \right)^{\frac{1}{2}} \left( \int_0^1 X_j^2 dj \right)^{\frac{1}{2}}.$$

- Example 4: Define production function

$$y_i = \int_0^1 h(a_{i,j}) I(i,j) dj,$$

where  $h$  is a truncated linear function satisfying

$$h(a) = \begin{cases} a & \text{if } a \leq a_{\max} \\ a_{\max} & \text{if } a > a_{\max} \end{cases}, \text{ where } a_{\max} \in (1, \infty) \text{ is an}$$

arbitrary truncation point.

- Under Pareto distribution ( $\sigma = 1$ ), we have

$$Y = \frac{(1 + \Phi)a_{\max}}{\exp(\Phi)} \exp \left\{ \int_0^1 \log(X_j) d_j \right\},$$

which is the Cobb-Douglas function with continuum of inputs.

- A special case:

$$y_i = h(a_i)k + h(b_i)n.$$

We have

$$Y = \tilde{B}(\Phi) K^{\frac{\alpha}{\alpha+\beta}} L^{\frac{\beta}{\alpha+\beta}}.$$

