題目:On the Timing and Depth of a Manufacturer’s Sales Promotion Decisions with Forward-looking Consumers
主講人:普渡大學管理學院劉焱博士
時間:2009年12月3日星期四,下午13:30—15:00
地點:經管學院 舜德樓101室
講座語言:英文
摘要:This paper investigates a manufacturer’s optimal timing and depth of price promotions over a planning horizon in a frequently purchased packaged goods context. Promotion policy is the equilibrium outcomes of a dynamic game between consumers and the manufacturer. Consumers form expectation over future promotions and strategically time their purchase to coincide with the manufacturer’s promotion events. The forward-looking manufacturer takes this consumer behavior into account and dynamically evaluates promotional response of consumers in each choice segment based on their inventory levels when making optimal promotion decisions.