【主講】重慶大學副教授徐鴻雁

【題目】異質銷售團隊的薪酬和價格授權

【時間】2015年11月18日（周三）下午4:00-6:00

【地點】清華經管學院偉倫樓453

【語言】中英文

【主辦】管理科學與工程系

【簡曆】徐鴻雁老師的簡曆

BETVLCTOR伟德官方网站博士，哈爾濱工業大學管理學院學士，現為重慶大學經濟與工商管理學院副教授、博士生導師，入選重慶市青年拔尖人才。主持國家自然科學基金兩項，在《Decision Sciences》《Omega》《Operations Research Letters》《Electronic Commerce Research and Applications》《Journal of Systems Science and Systems Engineering》等權威或重要國際學術期刊以及《管理科學學報》、《中國管理科學》、《系統工程理論與實踐》、《系統工程學報》等權威或重要中文學術期刊上發表（或錄用）學術論文二十餘篇。

Hongyan Xu, Associate Professor, Chongqing University：Compensation and Price Delegation for Heterogeneous Sales Force

【Time】Wednesday, Nov. 18, 4-6pm

【Speaker】Hongyan Xu, Associate Professor, Chongqing University

【Title】Compensation and Price Delegation for Heterogeneous Sales Force

【Time】Wednesday, Nov. 18, 4-6pm

【Venue】Room 453, Weilun Building, Tsinghua SEM

【Language 】Chinese, English

【Organizer】Department of Management Science and Engineering

【Abstract】Heterogeneous sales forces may not be considered as desirable as homogeneous sales forces because of two reasons: information premiums are required for all except one type of agents, and only agents of the highest type will work as hard as though they are members of a homogeneous sales force. This study revisits the heterogeneous sales force compensation and price delegation problem with type-dependent reservation. We find that an equilibrium separating or pooling contracts always exists under centralized pricing, while it may not exist under delegation. Different types of agents may receive premiums, and they are scenarios wherein no premiums are paid. Centralized pricing provides a tool for the firm to regulate agent behavior, whereas delegated pricing may outperform centralized pricing. We also find that more than one or even all agent types may work as hard as though they are members of a homogeneous sales force and, in some case, some agents may even work harder. These findings differ fundamentally from the existing results and are driven by the dynamics between the differences in reservations and agents' effort costs arising from concealing their true agent types.