【主講】複旦大學助理教授窦一凡

【題目】多邊平台的動态競争和補貼策略

【時間】2015年11月27日（周五）下午2:30-4:00

【地點】清華經管學院偉倫樓385

【語言】中英文

【主辦】管理科學與工程系

【簡曆】窦一凡，現任複旦大學管理學院信息管理與信息系統系助理教授。窦一凡畢業于BETVLCTOR伟德官方网站經管學院管理科學工程系，先後獲管理學學士學位和管理學博士學位。他的主要研究興趣是電子商務、信息系統經濟學和信息産品營銷策略。窦一凡博士的研究工作先後發表在《Information System Research》《European Journal of Operational Research》等國際一流學術期刊上，并被ICIS /HICSS/PACIS/WISE等信息管理領域頂尖國際會議的論文集收錄。此外，窦一凡擔任了多個國際頂尖學術期刊的審稿人，并獲得2015《Management Science》的優秀服務獎。

Yifan Dou, Assistant Professor, Fudan University：Dynamic Platform Competition: Optimal Subsidizing Strategies

【Speaker】Yifan Dou, Assistant Professor, Fudan University

【Title】Dynamic Platform Competition: Optimal Subsidizing Strategies

【Time】Friday, Nov. 27, 2:30-4:00pm

【Venue】Room 385, Weilun Building, Tsinghua SEM

【Language】Chinese, English

【Organizer】Department of Management Science and Engineering

【Abstract】Platforms frequently employ subsidizing strategies to attract users (e.g., consumers) on one side in order to profit more from the other side (e.g., content providers) via cross-side network effects. Despite its importance in business practice, the academic literature is rare on optimal subsidizing strategies under dynamic platform competition. This paper aims to address this research question using a stylized game-theoretic model. First, we extend the single-period duopoly platform competition model in the literature to a two-period setting. We identify conditions when optimal subsidizing strategies in the single-period model carry through in the two-period setting, and more importantly, when not. In particular, we show that under symmetric duopoly, when the second period discount factor exceeds a certain threshold, subsidizing the consumer side in period 1 becomes optimal. This is new and contrasts sharply to the single-period model finding in the literature where subsidizing consumers is not optimal. Second, we investigate a new setting of asymmetric duopoly where one platform (called the incumbent) is endowed with an initial installed base on the consumer side. For example, the incumbent may employ the ``platform envelopment'' strategy by redirecting her existing customers into the new market in order to compete with her rival platform (called the startup). We investigate the impact of such an initial installed base on each platform's optimal subsidizing strategies. We are particularly interested in the startup's strategies when competing against such an incumbent. We identify regions when the startup should subsidize more, and more importantly, when less. For example and somewhat counter intuitively, so long as the network effects are not too strong, the startup does not need to extensively subsidize the consumer side in responding to a larger initial installed base of the incumbent.