【主講】楊君印第安納大學金融學助理教授

【主題】優秀經理人的經濟學分析

【時間】6月29日（星期五）14:30-16:00

【地點】清華經管學院舜德樓101

【語言】中/英文

【主辦】金融系

【簡介】* 主講内容、演講者、或其他相關背景資料

“Economics and Super Managers”, joint with Nina Baranchuk and Glenn MacDonald

We study an agency model with a novel combination of features { agents (CEOs) di？er

in their ability, ˉrms choose both the scope of the CEO's activities and their incentives,

and there is free entry by ˉrms. The outcome is an industry equilibrium in which ˉrms are

heterogenous in scope and output. That is, ˉrms hiring more able CEOs complement higher

ability with greater scope and stronger incentives, resulting in greater output. Pay has a

strong \superstars" element in the sense that motivating higher ability CEOs to accept a

job involving more e？ort and greater risk of managing greater scope, requires much greater

rewards.

The model is a simple one that makes strong assumptions; this allows us to analyze it very

completely and arrive at sharp conclusions. For example, we ˉnd that an increase in de-

mand for the industry's product, e.g., a booming economy or opening of foreign economies,

increases both the overall level and skewness of the cross section distribution of CEO com-

pensation. The model suggests a variety of other empirical predictions.

Some preliminary empirical work suggests the model may prove quite useful for under-

standing some interesting trends in compensation. For example, our model provides an

explanation for the recent increased level and dispersion in CEO compensation that is

rooted in product market competition and rational board reaction to changes in the ˉrm's

environment.

詳情請點擊附件：| resume_IU.pdf